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Abstract—Current practices of fault-tolerant network design
ignore the fact that most network infrastructure faults are
localized or spatially correlated (i.e., confined to regions). Network
operators require new tools to mitigate the impact of such
region based faults on their infrastructures. Utilizing the support
from the U.S. Department of Defense, and by consolidating a
wide range of theories and solutions developed in the last few
years, the authors of this paper have developed an advanced
Network Planning and Management Tool (NPMT) that facilitates
the design and provisioning of robust and resilient networks.
The tool provides multi-faceted network design, evaluation and
simulation capabilities for network planners. Future extensions
of the tool currently being worked upon not only expand the tools
capabilities, but also extend these capabilities to heterogeneous
interdependent networks such as communication, power, water
and satellite networks.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
It is extremely important that planners for large wide area
networks have the right tools to design robust and resilient
networks that can effectively withstand large scale geograph-
ically correlated failures in their networks. Such failures can
be triggered by nature (hurricane or earthquake) or humans
(nuclear attack or conventional weapon attack over a large
geographical area). With research support from the U.S. De-
fense Threat Reduction Agency, an agency whose mission is to
protect the U.S. against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
such as nuclear, biological or chemical attacks, the authors
of this paper, over the last six years have developed a wide
ranging set of concepts and techniques for enhancing network
robustness against spatially correlated or region based faults.
We have recently incorporated these concepts and techniques
into a Network Planning and Management Tool (NPMT) [1]
for the benefit of network designers, planners and operators.
In this paper, we first describe the novel concepts developed
to design networks that are robust against region based faults,
and then describe how these concepts have been incorporated
into the NPMT. The goal of this paper is to bring to the
attention of the networking research community, and the
audience of the workshop on DRCN in particular, the existence
of NPMT as a tool that consolidates a large body of work on
spatially correlated failures, and as a tool that can be used by
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the community to meet the needs for robust network design
against spatially correlated failures. In essence, this paper’s
contribution should not be measured in terms of new analytical
findings, but in terms of service to the networking community.
We use the term WMD attack to imply a large scale
geographically correlated failure such as failures caused by an
earthquake, hurricane or nuclear attack. The characteristic of a
WMD attack is massive but localized faults. The connectivity
of a network [2] is generally accepted as a metric for evaluating
the fault-tolerance capability of a network [3]. If a network’s
connectivity is k + 1, then the network can tolerate up to k
faults, implying that the surviving network remains connected
even after k failures. The connectivity metric, however, has no
way of capturing locality, i.e., the faulty nodes/edges may be
close or far away from each other. Thus, the connectivity met-
ric cannot distinguish between faults that are geographically
correlated (a WMD fault characteristic), and faults that are not.
Connectivity as a metric also fails to capture other important
structural properties of the network such as the number or
size of the connected components [2] into which a network
disintegrates when the number of failed nodes/edges exceeds
the node/edge connectivity of the network.
Recognizing the limitations of connectivity as a metric
for capturing the special characteristics of geographically cor-
related failures, the authors of [4] introduced the notion of
region-based connectivity. A region may be defined either with
reference to the network graph or to the network geometry (i.e.,
layout of the network in a two or three dimensional space). For
example, a region may be defined as a subgraph with diameter
d (where the diameter of a graph is defined as the maximum
of the shortest path distance between a pair of nodes, taken
over all source-destination node pairs). Or, a region may also
be defined as a collection of nodes and edges in the network
graph layout that is covered by a circular area in that layout.
Figure 1(a) shows an example of a circular region-based fault.
The NPMT described in this paper is intended to support
design and analysis of single layered and multi-layered in-
terdependent heterogeneous networks. In essence, the NPMT
is particularly suitable for planning and design of critical
infrastructures. For example, from the single network layer
perspective, the NPMT enables backbone communication net-
work providers, such as, AT&T, Sprint, Qwest and Level 3
Communications, to (i) identify the most vulnerable parts of
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Fig. 1: (a) Network with circular fault region, (b) Optical fiber network of a major U.S. provider, (c) Optical Fiber network of a major European
provider disrupted by a WMD attack
their network against a WMD attack, and (ii) reinforce the
network with least cost to eliminate or significantly reduce
the threat of network disruption due to a WMD attack. Figure
1(b) shows the backbone network of a major U.S. provider
and Figure 1(c) shows how the backbone network of a major
European provider can potentially be disrupted by a WMD
attack. From a multi-layer perspective the NPMT can be used
for design and analysis of smart cities, where heterogeneous
networks ranging from disparate telecom networks (such as
2G, 3G, WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.) to water, electricity and gas
distribution networks, form a complex interdependent ecosys-
tem. Subsequently, failures in one network, for example a leak
in the water distribution network, may deteriorate other nearby
(spatially correlated) infrastructures such as gas or electricity
whose pipes and cables may get affected due to the leak. In this
context, a tool like NPMT can be an asset for utility companies
and smart city planners to quickly perform (i) root cause
analysis of failure, and (ii) forecast fault evolution, to direct
repairs and maintenance towards specific network components
and restrict fault propagation. To the best of our knowledge no
such tool is available today that supports features for planning
and designing of single layer and multi-layer interdependent
networks in the presence of spatially correlated faults.
Several studies in the network research community have
focused on different aspects of spatially correlated or region-
based faults in networks [5-11], however, to the best of our
knowledge there does not exist an executable platform that
consolidates the findings and techniques of these studies into
a readily usable tool. The NPMT is intended to fill that gap
and be such a platform that can incorporate the outcomes
developed in [5-11] into executable modules to be integrated
into the NPMT. This will allow network designers, planners
and operators to use the results of these studies in their real
world operational networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II we present an overview of the underlying concepts and
theoretical results that the NPMT operates on. In Section III
we outline the capabilities of the NPMT and finally Section
IV concludes this paper.
II. CONCEPTS, METRICS AND SOLUTION TECHNIQUES
In this section we give a brief overview of the underlying
concepts, metrics and solution techniques that the Network
Planning and Management Tool (NPMT) utilizes to carry out
its functional operations. The NPMT is built as a modular
execution engine that can execute smaller reusable modules
to perform desired operations on a network topology. In this
respect, the current version of the NPMT comprises of different
modules that deal with both static and dynamic aspects of
robust and resilient network design. The modular approach
allows design, development and testing of these modules to
be done independently and defers the integration into the
NPMT until a module meets it’s functional requirements. In
the following sub-sections we give a brief overview of the
analytical foundations of these modules. It may be noted that,
as of writing this paper not all modules have been implemented
and integrated into the NPMT. Accordingly, we highlight our
ongoing work in the discussion below.
A. Region-Based Fault Metrics Computation Module
As outlined in Section I, connectivity as a metric fails to
capture several characteristics of the network in presence of
spatially correlated failures. For instance, the number or size of
the connected components into which a network disintegrates
in the presence of a spatially correlated fault is not captured by
the traditional connectivity metric. In order to overcome these
gaps and capture such network state characteristics, several
metrics and their computation techniques have been proposed
by the research community. For a given network topology, the
NPMT can analyze the network and compute metrics pertinent
to network state in the presence of spatially correlated faults.
The following metrics are supported by the NPMT:
Region-based Connectivity Metric Computation
Region based connectivity can be considered under two fault
models – (i) Single Region Fault Model (sRFM) where faults
are confined to a single region [4], and (ii) Multiple Region
Fault Model (mRFM) where faults are confined to k regions
for some specified k [12].
Formally, in sRFM, the single-region-based (node) con-
nectivity of graph G with a specified definition of region R,
sκR(G), is defined as follows: Suppose that {R1, . . . , Rk} is
the set of all possible regions of the graph G. Consider a
k-dimensional vector T whose i-th entry, T [i], indicates the
number of nodes in region Ri whose failure will disconnect
the graph G. If the graph G remains connected even after the
failure of all nodes of the region Ri then T [i] is set equal to
∞. The region-based connectivity of a graph G with region




In mRFM, the multi-region-based (node) connectivity of graph
G with a specified definition of region R, mκR(G), is defined
as the minimum number of regions whose removal (i.e.,
removal of all nodes in the regions and edges incident on them)
will disconnect the graph.
Polynomial time algorithms to compute region-based con-
nectivity in sRFM was presented in [4]. The NPMT contains an
implementation of this algorithm that can be used to compute
the Region-based Connectivity for a given network topology.
Region-based Component Decomposition Number
(RBCDN) Metric Computation
Proposed by the authors of [13], the Region-Based Compo-
nent Decomposition Number, or RBCDN of graph G = (V,E)
with a specified definition of region R is defined the following
way: Suppose that {R1, . . . , Rk} is the set of all possible
regions of the graph G. Consider a k-dimensional vector C
whose i-th entry, C[i], indicates the number of connected
components in which G decomposes when all entities in Ri




RBCDN as a metric provides a insight into the worst case
scenario on how fragmented a network can become in the
presence of a spatially correlated fault. In [13] the authors
propose techniques to compute the RBCDN and the NPMT
provides an implementation of this algorithm that can be used
on user selected network topologies.
Region-based Smallest/Largest Component Size Metric
Computation
The Region-Based Smallest (Largest) Component Size, or
RBSCS/RBLCS was proposed in [14], and is defined for
a graph G = (V,E) with a specified definition of region
R, as follows: Suppose that {R1, . . . , Rk} is the set of all
possible regions of the graph G. Consider a k-dimensional
vector CS (CL) whose i-th entry, CS [i] (CL[i]), indicates the
size of the smallest (largest) connected component in which G
decomposes when all nodes in Ri fails. The RBSCS αR(G)
and RBLCS βR(G) of graph G with region R is defined as:
αR(G) = min
1≤i≤k
CS [i] and βR(G) = min
1≤i≤k
CL[i]
The RBLCS and RBSCS metrics provide insights on how well
a network’s performance degrades in the presence of region-
based faults. Depending on the needs of graceful performance
degradation, networks designers may choose to design net-
works that have a small value of RBCDN (δR(G)) and a high
value of either RBLCS (αR(G)) or RBSCS (βR(G)). The
NPMT allows the user to compute the RBLCS and RBSCS
metrics for a chosen network topology.
B. Distinct Regions Computation Module
It may be noted that all the previously defined metrics
operate on a given graph and a set of regions. Thus, there
is a need for techniques to compute the set of regions, given
a network and some fault specification. In [14], given a graph
G’s layout on a two-dimensional plane and a fault radius r,
the authors provide a polynomial time algorithm to compute all
distinguishable or distinct circular regions with radius r. Two
fault regions are considered indistinguishable if they contain
the same set of links and nodes. The authors considered both
wired networks, where nodes and edges can be part of a failure
region, and wireless networks, where only nodes can be part
of a failure region. It was shown in [14] that the number of
distinct regions in wireless and wired networks are O(n2)
and O(n4) respectively, and that all distinct regions can be
computed in O(n6) time, where n is the number of nodes.
The NPMT is bundled with an implementation of the
technique outlined in [14]. Given a network topology and a
fault radius, the NPMT can compute all distinct regions of
the network which can then be used by other modules of
the NPMT, such as the Metric Computation Module and the
Region-disjoint Path Computation Module (discussed next).
C. Region-disjoint Paths Computation Module
For a graph G = (V,E), a set of region-disjoint paths
P between a source node s and destination node d with a
specified definition of region R, is defined as follows: Suppose
that {R1, . . . , Rk} is the set of all possible regions of graph
G and path Pu ∈ P contains a set of nodes and edges from
G such that Pu forms a path from s to d, {s, d} ∈ V . Then,
for every pair of paths {Pu,Pv} ∈ P, u 6= v, Pu and Pv are
region-disjoint, i.e. there is no region in R that both the paths
traverse. Formally, region-disjoint paths are defined as follows,
for all i = 1, . . . , k:
|(Pu ∩Ri) ∩ (Pv ∩Ri)| = 0,∀{Pu,Pv} ∈ P, u 6= v
Although region-disjoint path computation has been addressed
in [8], the authors consider a model where faults do not cause
edges to fail unless a failed edge is associated with a failed
node. In this model an edge cannot fail on it’s own and can
only fail when one of the nodes incident on the edge fails. This
assumption is considerably restrictive and possibly unusable
for designers of larger networks where spatially correlated
faults can affect nodes and edges independently. In order to
overcome this limitation the NPMT supports computation of
region-disjoint paths in the presence of circular faults using an
Integer Linear Program (ILP) that doesn’t presuppose any such
restrictions. The NPMT is capable of computing two region-
disjoint paths from given source and destination nodes such
that the sum of lengths of the two paths is minimum. Also, as
the source (destination) node is part of a region that is traversed
by both paths (as both paths have the same staring and ending
points), no region disjoint path may exist. To accommodate this
situation the NPMT accommodates the use of no-fault zones
– a circular area around the source and destination nodes that
is immune to faults. Future extensions of this module include
computing more than two paths, and including other selection
criteria such as minimizing the maximum path length.
D. Region-based Fault Tolerant Distributed File Storage Mod-
ule
In the preceding discussions the importance of a node
in keeping the network connected is emphasized, however,
individual nodes can also act as data stores of the network
and the removal of a node from a network (due to a region-
based fault), may not only cause connectivity losses, but also
data losses. To address such data loss risks, distributed storage
techniques are often employed that enhances data survivability
in the presence of faults. One such technique is redundancy,
such as by (i) storing multiple copies of the entire file, or
(ii) storing different fragments of the same file at different
nodes in the network. In the popular (N,K), N ≥ K file
distribution scheme, from a file F of size |F |, N segments
of size |F |/K are created in such a way that it is possible to
reconstruct the entire file by accessing any K segments. For
such a reconstruction scheme to work, it is essential that the
K segments of the file are stored in nodes that are connected
to each other in the network. However, in the event of failures,
the network may become disconnected (i.e., split into several
connected components) and K segments may not be accessible
in the residual network to reconstruct the file F .
From the context of data survivability in the presence of
spatially correlated faults in networks, the NPMT supports
a “Region-based Distributed File Storage Module” that im-
plements an algorithm proposed in [11] that ensures that:
(i) even when the network is fractured into disconnected
components due to a region-based fault, at least one of the
largest components will have access to at least K distinct file
segments with which to reconstruct the entire file, and (ii)
the total storage requirement is minimized. As of writing this
paper, this module is currently under development and will be
part of the NPMT upon its completion.
E. Robust Multi-layer Interdependent Network Design Module
In today’s world, a multitude of heterogeneous intercon-
nected networks form a symbiotic ecosystem that supports all
of the economic, political and social aspects of human life.
For example, the critical infrastructures of the nation such
as the power grid and the communication network are highly
interdependent on each other, and any adverse effects on one
network can affect the other network. Thus, isolated network
analysis is no longer sufficient to design and operate such
interconnected and interdependent network systems.
Recognizing this need for a deeper understanding of the
interdependency in such multi-layered network systems, signif-
icant efforts have been made by the research community in the
last few years, and accordingly, a number of analytical models
have been proposed to analyze such interdependencies [15-17].
However, most of these models are simplistic and fail to
capture the complex interdependencies that may exist between
entities of the power grid and communication networks. To
overcome the limitations of existing models, the authors of
[18] have proposed an Implicative Interdependency Model that
is able to capture such complex interdependency. Utilizing
this model, several problems on multi-layer interdependent
networks have been studied, such as (i) identification of the
K most vulnerable nodes [18], (ii) root cause analysis of
failures [19], (iii) the entity hardening problem [20], (iv) the
smallest pseudo-target set identification problem [21], and (v)
the robustness analysis problem [22].
This module will support multi-layer network interdepen-
dency modeling using the Implicative Interdependency Model,
and analysis of multi-layer networks using the techniques pro-
posed in [18-22]. The module is currently under development
and will be part of the NPMT upon its completion.
F. Module for Progressive Recovery from Region-based Fail-
ures
With this module, the NPMT addresses post-fault recovery
techniques in the aftermath of region-based faults on multi-
layer interdependent networks. To restore an interdependent
network system from a post-fault scenario to its pre-failure
state, all the faulty network entities (nodes/edges) have to be
repaired or replaced. However, resource limitations may pre-
vent simultaneous restoration of all failed units of the network.
Accordingly, the failed units have to be restored in a sequenced
manner. As each network entity in its operational state adds
some utility value to the interdependent network system, when
a unit recovers from a failed state to an operational state,
the unit starts providing some “benefit” to the system. Since
different units have different utility values to the system, the
sequence in which the failed units are restored is important as
the recovery sequence determines the cumulative system utility
during the recovery process.
As discussed in Section II-E, the Implicative Interdepen-
dency Model provides a powerful technique for modeling
dependencies in multi-layer interdependent networks. Using
this model the authors of [23] studied the progressive recovery
problem in interdependent networks with the objective of
maximizing system utility during the system recovery process.
This module implements the progressive recovery algorithm of
[23], and can be used to sequence recovery of network entities
from a post-fault to a pre-fault network state that maximizes
system utility during the recovery process. The module is
currently under development and will be part of the NPMT
upon its completion.
III. ARCHITECTURE AND SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
In this section we first outline the system architecture, and
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Fig. 2: The NPMT High-Level Architecture
The NPMT is implemented as a web-application that
allows the user to remotely connect and operate the tool from
a browser. The web-application follows the standard three-tier
architecture and has a client tier, application tier, and database
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: (a) Topology Manager – create, edit and manage network topologies, (b) Fault Analyzer – generic fault analysis, metric computations
tier. The tool has been developed following the Model-View-
Controller (MVC) design pattern. Figure 2 outlines the high
level architecture and some of the components of the tool.
The tool is currently accessible from Arizona State Univer-
sity’s WAN, and runs from our testbed server. The tool’s web-
application is deployed on an Apache Tomcat 7 instance, and
the repository used is MySQL. The application tier business
logic for operations on network topologies, such as Region-
Based Fault Analysis and Region Disjoint Path Analysis, are
implemented in Java. Additional packages and libraries, such
as IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio libraries (required
for solving Integer Linear Programs), are setup and made
available on the testbed server. Our testbed server is a 64-
bit Intel Core 2 Quad Core (2.66 GHz) system with 8 GB of
RAM running an Ubuntu 14.04 instance.
B. System Capabilities
The NPMT is designed to be used by following a three
step workflow comprising of (i) Network Creation, (ii) Net-
work Analysis, and (iii) Network Simulation. Accordingly, the
individual features and the executable modules of the NPMT
are bundled around these three workflow steps. The following
list enumerates the current high-level features of the tool and
the corresponding workflow step that each feature emulates:
1) Topology Management (Network Creation)
2) Fault Analysis (Network Analysis)
3) Path Analysis (Network Analysis)
4) Traffic and Fault Impact Simulation (Network Simulation)
Each of the above features are accessible from a tabbed
interface of the tool and can be navigated to from any part of
the web-application. In the following subsections we discuss
each of the features and provide a brief functional overview.
Topology Management
Network Creation is the first step of the NPMT workflow and
the Topology Manager interface allows the user to create, edit,
save and delete network topologies. The Topology Manager
presents the user with a geographical map interface that she
can interact with to manage network topologies. The displayed
map tiles are rendered from OpenStreetMap [24]. The NPMT
uses the OpenLayers API to support an user interactive map
interface.
To create the topology and place nodes and edges on the
map, the user can either point-and-click on the map itself,
or can type in specific latitude and longitude coordinates and
then proceed to add the network entity. Capacities for each
edge (in Gigabits per second), can also be specified during the
edge creation process. Once a network topology is created, the
topology must be saved to be used for Network Analysis and
Network Simulation. The topologies are saved on the NPMT
server and can be loaded back into the Topology Manager to
edit any entity or attribute of the network.
Figure 3(a) shows a screen grab of the Topology Manager.
As seen in the figure, the map interface is on the right and the
user interact-able menu is on the left. The user can click on the
map to to add nodes and edges, or can alternatively type in the
latitude and longitude coordinates in the input fields available
on the menu. The menu also lists the nodes and edges that are
part of the topology. Selecting an edge or node from these lists
highlights the network entity on the map (in yellow), and the
user can then proceed to remove the entity from the network if
necessary. The displayed map overlays can be toggled from a
dropdown menu available on the map (in blue in Figure 3(a)).
Finally, as seen in Figure 3(a), options for saving, loading, and
deleting topologies are available to the user directly below the
displayed map’s dimensions.
Fault Analysis
Once network topologies are created from the Topology Man-
ager, the Fault Analyzer can be used to analyze the created
networks for their resilience in the presence of spatially cor-
related faults. In the context of the NPMT, network resiliency
is measured by how well the network performs when bench-
marked against the metrics outlined in Section II-A. It may
be noted that the metrics of Section II-A emphasize resilience
from the aspect of connectivity in the presence of a spatially
correlated fault. For example, the more number of disconnected
components a network has due to a fault, the worse is the
network’s resilience (as captured by the metric RBCDN). It
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Fig. 4: Fault Analyzer - Specified Fault Analysis. (a) User specified fault coordinates, (b) Fault impact of the user defined fault and an imported
library fault (coordinates for the state of California, USA)
may be noted that, for the purpose of this analysis the NPMT
assumes that any network entity (nodes/edges), that fall within
the fault area are all rendered inoperable, i.e. the fault model
is deterministic and if a network entity falls within the fault
region, it necessarily fails. To carry out this analysis, the user
first selects a network topology and can then choose to either
perform a generic fault analysis, or a specified fault analysis.
These analyses are described below.
Generic Fault Analysis: In the generic fault analysis, for a
selected network topology, the user specifies a fault feature and
the tool computes the values of the individual metrics listed
in Section II-A. The NPMT can generically analyzes circular
faults, and the supported fault feature is the fault radius r.
As shown in Figure 3(b), the user can specify the fault
radius r from the left menu. The tool then performs the
generic fault analysis by (i) computing all the distinct re-
gions with radius r using the techniques implemented in
the module “Distinct Regions Computation Module” (Section
II-B), and (ii) computes the individual metrics using the
techniques implemented in the module “Region-Based Fault
Metrics Computation Module” (Section II-A). The results
are subsequently reported back to the user. For the network
selected in Figure 3(b) and radius r = 500 km., the computed
Region-based Component Decomposition Number (RBCDN)
is 2, the Region-based Largest Component Size (RBLCS) is 9
and the Region-based Smallest Component Size (RBSCS) is
1. Finally, the number of distinct regions computed is 112.
As shown in Figure 3(b), the user is also presented with
sample worst case fault scenarios where a distinct fault causes
the network to fragment into the same number of components
as the RBCDN. Selecting one of the listed faults updates
the displayed network with the fault’s impact. In Figure 3(b)
the fault centered at 36.249◦N , −85.696◦E is selected. The
nodes and edges rendered inoperable by the fault are grayed
out, while the surviving nodes and edges are shown in green
and black respectively. The connected components in the
fragmented network are highlighted by a light-green region. In
this example, the loss of the two grayed out nodes causes the
network to fragment into two disconnected components: one
with 9 components, and the other with 1 component. Options
for saving the analysis results are available from the menu.
Specified Fault Analysis: In the specified fault analysis, the
user can provide the exact coordinates of one or more faults
and visualize the impact of these faults on the selected network.
The user has the option to save and load faults to visualize the
impact of a fault on different networks. The NPMT also comes
bundled with a set of library faults that the user can choose
from to simulate fault impact on a network. The current set
of library faults consist of the coordinates of the 50 states
of the USA. The inclusion of a fault library in the NPMT is
to provide the user with pre-defined fault scenarios based on
known fault patterns, faults centered at a target of interest, or
recorded faults. For example, fault impact zones of Level 4
hurricanes such as hurricane Katrina or hurricane Sandy.
As shown in Figure 4(a), to specify the exact coordinates of
the fault region the user can either type in the exact coordinates
of the fault region coordinates, or can click on the map to add
such coordinates. The user also has the option for importing
library faults. Once all the fault regions are defined, the NPMT
can simulate the impact of the fault on the selected network.
In Figure 4(b), apart from the user specified fault region,
the boundary of the state of California has been imported
from the fault library and the selected network has been
analyzed for these two fault regions. The updated map shows
the impacted nodes and edges in gray, while the operable
nodes and edges are shown in green and black respectively.
The connected components are shown with a green region. As
seen in Figure 4(b) the menu displays impact statistics such
as, the number of surviving nodes/edges and the number of
connected components. The user is provided with the option
to save the analysis results for later reference, and also the
option to save the defined fault regions for later use.
Path Analyzer
The Path Analyzer allows the user to analyze the network by
computing paths between source and destination nodes that
provide protection against spatially correlated faults. As in the
Fault Analyzer, the Path Analyzer allows the user to specify
a fault feature, and the tool then proceeds to compute paths
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Path Analyzer - Region disjoint paths between a source and destination nodes for given fault radius (r) and no-fault zone radius (nfr)
(a) r = 100 km., nfr = 300 km. (b) r = 120 km., nfr = 300 km.
between a given source and destination node pair such that (i)
at least one of the paths survive in the presence of one or more
spatially correlated faults, and (ii) satisfy some other network
resource constraint.
In the current version of the tool the faults considered
are circular faults and the supported fault feature that can
be specified by the user is the fault radius r. The number
of spatially correlated faults considered for path analysis is
one, and the number of paths computed is two, i.e. the NPMT
computes two paths such that if a single circular fault with
radius r occurs anywhere in the network, at least one of the two
paths computed will not be affected by the fault. The network
resource constraint supported is that the sum of lengths of the
two paths computed must be minimum.
It may be noted that a single fault can also render inoper-
able either the source node, or the destination node, or both,
and thus there always exists a fault region that affects all paths
computed and no region disjoint paths can exist such that at
least one path remains immune to the fault. To accommodate
this case when the source and/or destination nodes themselves
are part of the fault region, the NPMT supports a “No-Fault
Zone” parameter. The user can specify a no-fault zone radius
nfr for both the source and destination nodes that reserves
two circular areas with radius nfr centered at the source and
destination nodes such that network entities, or parts of a
network entity (such as an edge segment), that falls within
this no-fault zone are immune to faults.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show screen grabs of the path
analyzer computation for different input values of fault radius
(r). The no-fault zone set to a radius of nfr = 300 km. and
is shown as a white circular region centered at the source and
destination nodes. The computed paths are shown in orange
and blue, and the lengths of each of these to paths are reported
in the left menu. The effect of the path selection criteria, i.e.
the sum of the lengths of the two paths must be minimum,
is also visible in Figures 5(a) and 5(b). In Figure 5(a) when
r = 100 km., the sum of lengths of the two paths is 5793.24
km., however in Figure 5(b) increasing r to 120 km. the
previously computed paths are no longer feasible as a region
fault exists that can impact both these paths. Hence, new paths
are computed and the sum of the new lengths is 5921.69 km.
Traffic and Fault Impact Simulation
For a selected network, the Traffic and Impact Simulator allows
users to generate traffic and faults to analyze the impact of
faults on a load bearing network. To perform this analysis,
a simulation schedule consisting of bandwidth requests and
faults is generated by the NPMT using user provided simula-
tion parameters. Parameters such as total number of time steps
in the schedule, total number of requests in the schedule, min-
imum/maximum request bandwidth and minimum/maximum
request hold times can be specified by the user. The source and
destination nodes for each request can be generated randomly,
or can be user specified. For introducing faults in the schedule,
the user can specify the number of faults to introduce and can
either specify the exact fault coordinates, or introduce random
circular faults from the set of all possible distinct circular faults
for a specified fault radius. Time intervals of the faults can be
user specified, or can be randomly generated by the NPMT.
Using the request and fault settings, the NPMT then generates
a time stepped simulation schedule of requests and faults. Once
the schedule is finalized, the user can specify the algorithm to
be used in the simulation to route requests from source and
destination nodes, and then proceed to run the simulation.
As shown in the screen grabs of Figures 6(a) and 6(b), the
left menu of the Traffic and Impact Simulator contains the fault
and simulation parameter fields that can be used to generate
the schedule and run the simulation. The tables below the
map’s dimensions allow the user fine grained control over the
requests and faults that will be simulated. Once the simulation
is complete, for each time interval the network state can be
visualized from the “Event Simulation Results” table. The user
can click on a row of this table to visualize the network state
on the map for that specific time interval. The user can also
“play” the simulation results and the NPMT will iterate over
all the time steps and update the map with the network state
at each step. In Figures 6(a) and 6(b) the impact of a fault
and the corresponding response of the network is shown. In
Figure 6(a) the network is fault free, but in Figure 6(b) a fault
is introduced and an edge is rendered inoperable. It can be
seen that the red and yellow flows of Figure 6(a) are impacted
by the fault, however, as bandwidth is available, in Figure 6(b)
the flows are rerouted in response to this fault.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Traffic and Fault Impact Simulator (a) Pre-Fault network state, (b) Post-Fault network state – rerouted red and yellow flows)
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a summary of the work done
towards developing a Network Planning and Management Tool
(NPMT), intended to support design and analysis of single
layer and multi-layer networks in the presence of spatially
correlated faults. We highlighted that the NPMT is particularly
suitable for planning and design of critical infrastructures.
We described the underlying novel concepts that have been
developed to enhance robustness of networks in presence of
region based faults, and then described how those concepts
have been incorporated into the NPMT. The goal of this
paper was to bring to the attention of the networking research
community, and to the audience of the workshop on DRCN
in particular, about the existence of NPMT as a tool that
consolidates a large body of work on spatially correlated faults.
To the best of our knowledge no such tool is available today
that supports planning and designing of single layer and multi-
layer networks in the presence of spatially correlated faults.
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